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In two comprehensive and fully incentivized studies, we investigate the development
of ingroup favoritism as one of two aspects of parochial altruism in repeated social
dilemmas. Specifically, we test whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed phenomenon that
can be observed from the very beginning and remains stable over time, or whether
it develops (increases vs. decreases) during repeated contact. Ingroup favoritism is
assessed through cooperation behavior in a repeated continuous prisoner’s dilemma
where participants sequentially interact with 10 members of the ingroup (own city and
university) and subsequently with 10 members of the outgroup (other city and university),
or vice versa. In none of the experiments do we observe initial differences in cooperation
behavior for interaction partners from the ingroup, as compared to outgroup, and we only
observe small differences in expectations regarding the interaction partners’ cooperation
behavior. After repeated interaction, however, including a change of groups, clear ingroup
favoritism can be observed. Instead of being due to gradual and potentially biased
updating of expectations, we found that these emerging differencesweremainly driven by
the change of interaction partners’ group membership that occurred after round 10. This
indicates that in social dilemma settings ingroup favoritism is to some degree dynamic in
that it is enhanced and sometimes only observable if group membership is activated by
thinking about both the interaction with the ingroup and the outgroup.
Keywords: ingroup favoritism, intergroup contact, prisoner’s dilemma, social identity, social dilemmas
Introduction
Cooperation is an essential prerequisite for human social life, but it often involves social dilemma
situations that require individuals to decide whether to maximize selfish or collective interests.
A typical social dilemma situation is the following: a team of two people works together on a
collectively profitable project where benefits are shared evenly and independently of individual
contributions. Although the collective benefit would be highest if both team members contributed
as much as possible, the benefit of each individual is even higher if one chooses the non-cooperative
option given that the other member cooperates.
Numerous factors have been shown to influence the tendency of individuals to behave
cooperatively in social dilemmas or not (for overviews, see Dawes, 1980; Komorita and Parks,
1995; Zelmer, 2003; Van Lange et al., 2013). One important determinant is group affiliation,
that is, whether the partner is perceived as a member of the ingroup or the outgroup.
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Studies have repeatedly demonstrated ingroup favoritism, that is,
the tendency to favor members of one’s ingroup over outgroup
members both in social dilemma tasks (e.g., Goette et al., 2006;
Simpson, 2006; Balliet et al., 2014; De Dreu et al., 2014) and
beyond (e.g., for helping behavior in violent situations: Levine
et al., 2006; or after natural disasters: Levine and Thompson,
2004; see Hewstone et al., 2002, for an overview).
In the context of social dilemmas, ingroup favoritism is usually
found in the form of higher cooperation rates toward ingroup
members compared to outgroup members (e.g., Wit and Wilke,
1992; De Cremer and van Vugt, 1999; Goette et al., 2006,
2012) and higher expectations regarding cooperation behavior
for the ingroup as compared to the outgroup (e.g., Yamagishi
et al., 2008). As applied to the introductory example above, each
individual’s tendency to contribute to the joint project should
be higher if the interaction partner belongs to the same group
as compared to a different group (e.g., the same vs. a different
university).
Overall, a comprehensive meta-analysis summarizing the
results of 212 studies from 77 publications (Balliet et al., 2014)
finds a small to medium effect size, indicating that people are
more cooperative with ingroup compared to outgroup members
(d = 0.32), and a slightly stronger effect on expectations
concerning cooperation (d = 0.41). The meta-analysis identified
several moderators for ingroup favoritism, such as bilateral
knowledge of groupmembership (i.e., both people know whether
they are from the same or different groups) or the frequency of
interactions (one shot vs. repeated). Although, most of the studies
assessing repeated interactions acknowledge that cooperation
in general changes over time (typical declining pattern of
cooperation), none of the studies considers changes in ingroup
favoritism over repeated contact.
In the current work, we therefore aim to investigate possible
dynamics of ingroup favoritism at a cognitive and a behavioral
level over repeated interactions.
Dynamic Aspects of Ingroup Favoritism
The theory of parochial altruism explains ingroup favoritism
from an evolutionary perspective. It states that increased
cooperativeness toward the ingroup (ingroup love) is due to
parochial altruistic norms, which have an evolutionary origin.
According to the theory, ingroup favoritism represents, together
with aggressiveness against the outgroup (outgroup hate), a
genetic or cultural trait that has co-evolved in humans (Bernhard
et al., 2006; Rusch, 2014). Following this rationale, it could be
assumed that ingroup favoritism might prevail from the first
of repeated interactions. Several models for behavior in social
dilemmas (Van Lange et al., 2013) would predict the same.
According to the goal expectation theory proposed by Pruitt
and Kimmel (1977), individuals cooperate if they adopt the
goal of cooperation and expect their partner to reciprocate.
Similarly, Bogaert et al. (2008) proposed in their model that
cooperation is driven by an integration of context-specific
cooperative goals and context-specific expectations. Joint group
membership can function as an important context cue that
influences both the likelihood for adopting cooperation goals
and the expectations that the interaction partner will reciprocate
cooperation. The latter class of models, however, also highlights
the fact that repeated experiences can at least change expectations
and potentially also the tendency of individuals to take over
cooperation goals. Experiences should be updated in a roughly
rational manner, in that expectations after some time reflect the
average behavior of ingroup and outgroup members in the real
world.
As stated in the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), repeated
interactions with other persons (e.g., members from the
outgroup) can reduce prejudice and might therefore also reduce
differences between ingroup and outgroup. Indeed, previous
research has shown that discrimination against members from
the outgroup is reduced after repeated contact (Birtel and Crisp,
2012; see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, for a meta-analysis).
Not surprisingly, and also in line with a rational updating of
expectations, the opposite effect (i.e., increased discrimination)
was found in cases where the interaction with the outgroup
included negative experiences (Barlow et al., 2012). Following
this line of reasoning and in line with themodels explained above,
both a reduction and an enhancement of ingroup favoritism
are conceivable, depending on the actual experiences made with
different groupmembers. Expectations and cooperation behavior
should be adjusted, in line with actual experienced cooperation
and independently of group affiliation. If one experiences
higher cooperation from ingroup members than from outgroup
members, own expectations and cooperation should be adjusted
accordingly and ingroup favoritism should increase (or emerge
if it does not exist from the beginning). However, if both the
ingroup and the outgroup cooperate to the same degree, ingroup
favoritism should disappear, given an unbiased adjustment of
expectations and cooperation.
In contrast, one can assume that the adjustment of
expectations and cooperation behavior in repeated interactions
is not completely rational, depending not only on the degree
of experienced cooperativeness. Rather, it is possible that the
group affiliation of the interaction partner is a key factor for
the assessment of her or his behavior and the adjustment
of own expectations and cooperation behavior in subsequent
interactions. Categorical thinking about ingroup and outgroup
can shape the perception of the behavior of others (Macrae
and Bodenhausen, 2000; Mussweiler and Ockenfels, 2013),
which results in different attribution patterns in explaining the
behavior of the ingroup and the outgroup member. The ultimate
attribution error states that negative behavior is attributed
dispositionally when it is shown by the outgroup, whereas
positive behavior is attributed externally, and vice versa, for the
ingroup (Pettigrew, 1979). According to social identity theory,
this reflects the need to develop and maintain a positive self-
concept bymaximizing the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup
in contrast to an outgroup (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Hewstone
et al., 2002). As a consequence, a cognitive mechanism that
facilitates the processing of incoming social information in an
ingroup favoring light might be activated, causing different
generalization patterns for behavior from ingroup as compared
to outgroup members (Henderson-King and Nisbett, 1996). If
patterns of observations are consistently attributed in a rather
“friendly” manner for interactions with the ingroup and in an
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“unfriendly” manner for the outgroup, the (objectively) same
experiences of behavior should be generalized quite differently.
Based on the important work on the ultimate attribution
error and differential generalization patterns, people could be
expected to show an ingroup-favoring generalization bias in
repeated social dilemma interactions, as follows: while positive
behavior (cooperation) is more strongly generalized from one to
subsequent members of the ingroup, negative behavior is more
strongly generalized to outgroup members. In contrast to the
prediction of rational updating of expectations, this ingroup-
favoring generalization bias would lead to increasing ingroup
favoritism.
In two experiments we investigate (i) whether ingroup
favoritism is mainly driven by fixed initial differences or
dynamics that develop over repeated interactions, and (ii)
whether these dynamics reflect rational updating or an ingroup-
favoring generalization bias.
Investigating initial differences and potential dynamics of
ingroup favoritism is methodologically demanding. To assure
high internal and external validity we decided to use a repeated
version of a social dilemma game, in which participants interact
with different members of both groups (i.e., stranger matching
with change of groups after half of the trials). Additionally
to avoid effects due to artificial responses, participants interact
with real interaction partners and we use real incentives. Also
we use relatively salient and to some degree natural groups.
Furthermore, to learn more about drivers for possible dynamics,
expectations regarding cooperation are repeatedly measured.
Interestingly, although there are many studies published
on ingroup favoritism in social dilemmas (Balliet et al.,
2014, for an overview), none of them can be directly
used to derive clear predictions concerning our research
questions. First, none of them fulfills all the above mentioned
characteristics to properly investigate dynamics at the same
time. Specifically, from the seven studies reporting results from
repeated interactions in prisoner’s dilemmas, four do involve
fake interaction partners, which makes potential conclusions
concerning dynamics questionable (Wrightsman et al., 1972;
Baxter, 1973; Dion, 1973; Parks et al., 2001). Of the remaining
studies two do not involve interactions with members from
both groups (Wilson and Kayatani, 1968; Wallace and Rothaus,
1969) and another one does not use real groups but minimal
groups instead (Wilson et al., 1965). Second, due to being
interested in different topics, most studies do not report analyses
concerning the dynamics of ingroup and outgroup cooperation
over repeated interactions. An exception is the study by Wallace
and Rothaus (1969), which shows relatively stable cooperation
over time in the ingroup condition, but a decrease in cooperation
in the outgroup condition. However, the study does not report
changes in ingroup favoritism (comparison between ingroup
and outgroup cooperation) and, as stated before, it does not
include alternating interaction partners nor interactions with
both groups. Considering these limitations and taking into
account that most relevant studies have been published more
than 40 years ago our research questions cannot be answered
based on published results and neither by re-analyzing existing
data. Therefore, we conducted two new studies to directly address
them.
Overview of the Experiments
In our experiments, we investigate ingroup favoritism at a
cognitive and a behavioral level by measuring (a) whether there
are higher expectations regarding cooperation behavior for the
ingroup as compared to the outgroup and (b) whether there
is higher cooperation toward the ingroup compared to the
outgroup. We used repeated interactions in a prisoner’s dilemma
with a stranger-rematching protocol, in which individuals knew
that they would never interact with the same partner twice.
Participants sequentially interacted (got into contact) with 10
different members from the ingroup and subsequently with
10 different members from the outgroup, or vice versa, which
constituted a group change manipulation (contact with both
groups) between the two parts of the experiment. Group salience
was induced by a Skype conference of about 2min at the
beginning of the experiment, during which participants could
confirm that the outgroup actually existed. Participants sitting
together with their ingroup in one experimental laboratory
(in separate cubicles) could see the outgroup’s laboratory, but
could not identify the individual participants. Besides the Skype
conference, participants in Experiment 1 knew that they would
play the prisoner’s dilemma game with different people from
their own university and city (ingroup) or another university and
city (outgroup). To enforce the salience of the ingroup-outgroup
differentiation, and to make sure that our manipulation did not
prime the common identity of being a student, we conducted
Experiment 2 (which also served as a partial replication of
Experiment 1), in which participants were additionally told
which university and city their interaction partners came from.
On theoretical ground, we investigate the development of
ingroup favoritism and the underlying process driving this
development. In order to do so, we test for differential
hypotheses concerning generalization patterns that follow from
different classes of models and examine whether the dynamic
development of ingroup favoritism reflects rational updating or
an ingroup-favoring generalization bias.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 assesses whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed
phenomenon that can be observed from the first interaction
onwards and that remains stable over time, or whether it is a
dynamic construct that develops over time. Besides, Experiment
1 aims to identify drivers for potential dynamics in ingroup
favoritism.
Methods
Participants and Design
Seventy-two people (mainly students at the University of Bonn
and the University of Erfurt, 44 of whom were female) were
recruited via the online recruitment tool Orsee (Greiner, 2004)
and took part in the experiment. Subjects participated in
continuous prisoner’s dilemma games (for a detailed description,
see below) in groups of two. We manipulated as within-subjects
factor whether individuals played with different individuals
from their own city and university (ingroup) or with different
individuals from another city and university (outgroup). Sessions
consisted of 24 individuals, 12 in the experimental laboratory in
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Bonn and 12 in the experimental laboratory of the University
of Erfurt. Assignment to dyads and conditions was anonymous
and random. Participants played 10 rounds with different people
from one group. After round 10, a group change took place,
followed by another 10 rounds with different members of the
other group. For both parts, we used a stranger-rematching
protocol, so that participants never interacted with the same
person twice. The sequence of ingroup and outgroup conditions
was counterbalanced (session-wise).1 The experiment was
computerized and run using Bonn Experimental System (BoXS,
Seithe, 2012). Completing the experiment took participants
about 60min overall. Participants’ payments depended on their
decisions, and earnings ranged from 8.30 to 23.90 Euros (approx.
USD 11.20 to USD 32.30).2
Materials and Procedure
All participants were informed about the structure of the game
by detailed instructions which they read before beginning with
the experiment. Communication was forbidden throughout the
experiment. After reading the instructions, participants answered
six control questions to assure they had understood the rules.
Answers were checked by the experimenters and questions
were answered individually. After participants had read the
instructions and answered the control questions, we arranged a
live Skype conference with the other lab to assure our participants
that they would interact with people from another lab in real time
and to make group affiliation salient. As a manipulation check for
the effectiveness of our ingroup–outgroup manipulation, before
starting with the prisoner’s dilemma game, we assessed perceived
interpersonal closeness with both groups using a pictorial scale
containing seven graphical items for the overlap of self and
ingroup as well as self and outgroup (Aron et al., 1992; Schubert
and Otten, 2002). The repeated prisoner’s dilemma worked
as follows: In each round, participants were given a round
endowment of 10 Taler (1 Taler = 0.05 Euro). Both players
decided simultaneously which amount between 0 and 10 of
their round endowment to transfer to their current interaction
partner, whereas they kept the rest (10 – transferred amount) in
their private account. The money transferred to the interaction
partner was multiplied by a factor of 2. If both participants in
a dyad transferred their whole endowment of 10 Taler, each
player earned 20 Taler in this round. Hence, there was a potential
collective gain of 100% that could be realized by transferring
Taler to the interaction partner (cooperating). The individual
payoff was maximized, however, if a player did free-ride on the
cooperation of his or her interaction partner, that is, if the player
kept the round endowment and enjoyed the money the other
player transferred to her/him. Before participants made their
1Due to technical problems, we lost one session, which led to an unbalanced
number of order conditions (ingroup first vs. outgroup first). In two sessions
(N = 48), participants interacted with the ingroup first; in one session (N = 24),
participants interacted with the outgroup first.
2For Experiment 1, we also employed personality measures. Results for personality
measures of Experiment 1 are not reported here (and were not collected for
Experiment 2), but are available upon request. Instructions for both experiments
were provided in German. An English translation is provided in the online
supplementary materials.
cooperation decisions, they were asked about their expectations
regarding their current interaction partner’s cooperation by
typing any amount between 0 and 10 which they expected to
receive from their current partner.3 At the end of each round
participants were informed about the amount of money their
interaction partner transferred to them and their earning in the
current round.
Results
The interpersonal closeness scale reveals that people felt a higher
overlap between self and ingroup (M = 4.88, SD = 1.61), as
compared to self and outgroup (M = 3.05, SD = 1.49), prior to
playing the prisoner’s dilemma game [t(58) = 8.79, p < 0.001,
d = 1.19], indicating that our ingroup–outgroup manipulation
was successful and induced a large effect.4
First, we examined whether ingroup favoritism prevails
overall. We ran two ordinary least square (OLS) regressions
over all rounds, which predicted cooperation behavior and
expectations by group affiliation of the interaction partner
(dummy coded; outgroup = 0 vs. ingroup = 1). For the
regressions, we clustered at the individual level (Rogers, 1994)
and controlled for counterbalancing condition (ingroup first= 0
vs. outgroup first= 1) and experimental lab (Bonn= 0 vs. Erfurt
= 1).5 We found significantly increased average cooperation
for members of the ingroup as compared to members of the
outgroup, b = 0.70, t(71) = 3.07, p = 0.003, d = 0.21 (Table 1,
Model 1). Hence, overall cooperation toward the ingroup is 0.70
(out of 10) Talers higher for interactions with members from
the ingroup as compared to interactions with members from the
outgroup. A similar effect is observed for average expectations
concerning cooperation, which is increased by about the same
magnitude for the ingroup as compared to the outgroup, b =
0.74, t(71) = 3.00, p = 0.004, d = 0.24 (Table 1, Model 2).
In order to examine whether ingroup favoritism is a
fixed phenomenon that remains stable or whether it develops
dynamically over repeated contact, we calculated a mean bias
score (difference between ingroup and outgroup cooperation) for
3We assessed expectations prior to cooperation decisions and not the other way
around since we were interested in the factors driving ingroup favoritism and
therefore wanted to assess our predictor before our criterion. Due to the repeated
interaction design, the order of expectation and action assessment is crucial only
for the first round since afterwards in any case both kinds of assessments alternate
and this was common knowledge already prior to the start of the game. Also,
when analyzing the data without the very first round, the conclusion that ingroup
favoritism is dynamic did not change.
4Participants completed the whole interpersonal closeness measure (perceived
overlap between self and ingroup, self and outgroup, and ingroup and outgroup)
on three different occasions: Before the experiment started, after the first 10 rounds
(before participants received instructions for part 2 where they learned with whom
they would interact in the second part of the experiment), and in the end. At
all stages and for both studies, participants stated a higher overlap between self
and ingroup, as compared to self and outgroup. In both studies, the perceived
overlap between ingroup and outgroup diminished from time 1 to time 3. For 13
participants, we have missing values for the overlap between self and outgroup,
since some participants forgot to complete the reverse side of the questionnaire.
5Due to collinearity, we did not additionally include session dummies (we only
had one session where participants interacted with the outgroup first). To test
the robustness of our findings we additionally confirmed our analyses by applying
fixed-effects panel regressions with ingroup (vs. outgroup) as the within-subjects
(fixed-effects) variable when appropriate. This analysis led to the same conclusions.
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TABLE 1 | Regression analysis for cooperation and expectations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiment 1 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 2 Overall Overall
cooperation expectation cooperation expectation cooperation expectation
Interaction partner’s group affiliation (0
= outgroup; 1 = ingroup)
0.701** 0.740** 1.005*** 1.146*** 0.875*** 0.972***
(3.07) (3.00) (4.93) (5.58) (5.75) (6.14)
Experimental lab (0 = Bonn, 1 =
Erfurt)
0.490 0.671 0.278 0.110 0.369 0.351
(0.93) (1.59) (0.57) (0.30) (1.03) (1.27)
Counterbalancing condition (ingroup
first = 0 vs. outgroup first = 1)
1.534* 1.259** 0.749 0.731* 1.044** 0.899**
(2.51) (2.71) (1.54) (2.02) (2.80) (3.27)
Constant 2.966*** 3.323*** 3.119*** 3.351*** 3.039*** 3.342***
(7.65) (10.52) (8.25) (10.31) (11.23) (14.72)
Observations 1440 1440 1920 1920 3360 3360
Subjects/Cluster 72 72 96 96 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.061 0.030 0.043 0.039 0.045
t-statistics in parentheses, OLS regression analysis used, standard errors are clustered at the individual level, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
each round and collapsed over all participants, resulting in 20
data points (one for each round). Running a regression predicting
this bias score by the variable round, we found that ingroup
favoritism significantly increased over time (rounds), b = 0.21,
t(18) = 5.10, p < 0.001, which is in line with the dynamic
perspective. Hence, in each of the 20 rounds, favoring the ingroup
over the outgroup increased by 0.21 Talers, which is represented
by the red regression line in Figure 1 (left).
Interestingly, when comparing average contribution rates
for the ingroup and the outgroup, participants did not show
any ingroup favoritism (and even a tendency in the opposite
direction) in the first round, b = −0.85, t(69) = −1.05, p = 0.298
(Table 2, Model 1), but a tendency to do so for the last round,
b = 1.38, t(69) = 1.94, p = 0.056 (Table 2, Model 2).
6 This
results is also illustrated in Figure 1 (left), in that the bias score
for the first round (as well as subsequent rounds up to round 10)
is negative, whereas it is positive for the last round.7
Furthermore, we aimed to investigate what drives the change
in ingroup favoritism over time and led to the development
of ingroup favoritism after the first round. Since ingroup
favoritism concerning cooperation was not observable in the
first round, rational updating cannot account for the observed
6In the two regression analyses we predict cooperation by group (ingroup vs.
outgroup) in round 1 and round 20, respectively, additionally controlling for
experimental lab. We do not control for counterbalancing condition since this
information is included in the variable group due to considering the first and the
last trial only.
7Interestingly and although we do observe ingroup favoritism in both experiments,
when analyzing the first 10 rounds of Experiment 1 separately, we find a tendency
toward outgroup favoritism, b = −1.20, t(71) = −1.91, p = 0.060. In previous
studies occasionally also outgroup favoritism has been found in situations in which
the status of the ingroup was low as compared to the outgroup (e.g., Jost and
Burgess, 2000). In our study particularly effects of perceived status differences
between own and other universities cannot be fully precluded. Furthermore, since
in Erfurt mainly first-year students (95%) took part in the experiment, one could
assume additional effects of status or it might be the case that they did not
yet identify with their fellow students and preferred the outgroup instead. Both
explanations remain highly speculative and future research would be necessary to
explore this issue further.
dynamics. We therefore focus the investigation on the ingroup-
favoring generalization bias. According to an ingroup-favoring
generalization bias, positive experiences should be more strongly
generalized over the ingroup, as compared to the outgroup, and
vice versa for negative experiences. Stated differently, receiving
more than one expects should lead to a stronger increase in
expectations about members from the ingroup as compared
to the outgroup in the following round. Conversely, receiving
less than one expects should lead to a stronger decrease in
expectations for the outgroup, as compared to the ingroup.
Figure 2 (left) presents the observed changes in expectations
concerning cooperation as a function of positive or negative
experiences in the previous round.
As indicated by the similar slope of the regression lines for
ingroup and outgroup, and as further confirmed by a statistical
analysis, no differential effects were observed (interaction
between experience and ingroup) for positive, b = 0.03, t(70) =
0.51, p = 0.610 and negative experiences, b = −0.01,
t(68) = −0.09, p = 0.93.
8 Hence, there was no support
for an ingroup-favoring generalization bias (Table 3, Models 1
and 2).
For exploratory reasons, we further investigate whether
changing groups had any effect, which might activate social
identity by making group membership more salient. Comparing
cooperation rates between round 10 (last round with one group)
and 11 (first round with the other group), there is indeed a
sharp increase in ingroup favoritism, as indicated by a significant
8We conducted a regression analysis in which the change in expectations (current
expectation – expectation in the previous round) was predicted by the previous
experience with a member from the current group (received cooperation –
expected cooperation), a variable coding our ingroup–outgroup manipulation
(both variables centered) and their interaction. We furthermore again included
the control variables “lab” and “condition” and clustered at the individual level.
Analyses were run separately for positive experiences (i.e., receiving more than
expected) and negative experiences (i.e., receiving less than expected). A further
full factorial analysis including the three-way interaction of positive and negative
experiences led to the same conclusions.
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FIGURE 1 | Development of bias score (ingroup – outgroup cooperation) from round 1 to round 20 with group change and restart after round 10.
TABLE 2 | Regression analyses for cooperation in the first and the last round.
Cooperation (in Taler) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiment 1 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 2 Overall Overall
first round last round first round last round first round last round
Interaction partner‘s group affiliation
(0 = outgroup; 1 = ingroup)
−0.854 1.375+ 0.687 1.833** 0.0486 1.653***
(−1.05) (1.94) (0.94) (2.84) (0.09) (3.53)
Experimental lab (0 = Bonn, 1 =
Erfurt)
−0.0278 1.361* 0.229 0.417 0.119 0.821+
(−0.04) (2.04) (0.31) (0.65) (0.23) (1.77)
Constant 6.597*** 0.819 5.677*** 1.125* 5.996*** 1.006**
(8.60) (1.55) (9.01) (2.02) (12.42) (2.62)
Observations 72 72 96 96 168 168
Adjusted R2 −0.013 0.077 −0.011 0.064 −0.012 0.075
t-statistics in parentheses, OLS regression analysis used +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
interaction between round (round 10 vs. 11) and ingroup9,
(Table 4, Model 1).
When analyzing cooperation in round 10 and 11 separately
there was even a slightly lower cooperation rate toward the
ingroup as compared to the outgroup in round 10, b = −1.25,
t(69) = −1.41, p = 0.16 and strong ingroup favoritism was
observed in the first interaction with the new group b = 2.35,
t(69) = 3.21, p = 0.002. This is also illustrated in Figure 1 by
the jump from a negative bias score in round 10 to a positive
bias score in round 11. Hence, the significantly increasing bias
9Both variables centered.
score over several rounds is not a result of a gradual slope, but
rather of an abrupt rise of ingroup favoritism from round 10
to round 11, where the group change and restart took place.
Within the two phases of the experiment, the regression lines are
rather flat or even decreasing (Figure 1, left). Running the same
regression as before with the bias score as a criterion and adding
a dummy for the experimental phase (before or after group
change), the effect of round on ingroup favoritism is no longer
significant.
Interestingly, when controlling for expectations, the group
change effect is no longer significant either, indicating that
changes in expectations mediate the effects of activated social
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ingroup and the outgroup in Experiment 1 and 2.
TABLE 3 | Regression analysis for changes in expectations due to positive or negative experience in the previous round.
Change in expectation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(current round – Experiment 1 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 2 Overall Overall
previous round) positive negative positive negative positive negative
experiences experiences experiences experiences experiences experiences
Experience (amount received –
expectation)
0.122* 0.411*** 0.312*** 0.417*** 0.237*** 0.419***
(2.54) (6.25) (7.21) (6.68) (6.86) (9.24)
Interaction partner’s group affiliation
(0 = outgroup; 1 = ingroup)
0.0661 −0.263 0.324 0.210 0.243 −0.0136
(0.30) (−0.73) (1.11) (0.63) (1.20) (−0.05)
Experience*group affiliation 0.0281 −0.0109 −0.0239 0.0899 −0.0148 0.0433
(0.51) (−0.09) (−0.32) (0.93) (−0.28) (0.56)
Experimental lab (0 = Bonn, 1 =
Erfurt)
0.307 0.367 0.00204 −0.232 0.163 0.0508
(1.51) (1.48) (0.01) (−0.89) (1.05) (0.28)
Counterbalancing condition −0.191 0.0396 −0.0886 0.182 −0.172 0.0619
(ingroup first = 0 vs. outgroup
first =1)
(−0.88) (0.14) (−0.42) (0.72) (−1.12) (0.34)
Constant 0.621** −0.364 0.0176 −0.415+ 0.273+ −0.341*
(3.19) (−1.64) (0.08) (−1.78) (1.67) (−2.11)
Observations 524 606 691 751 1215 1357
Subjects/Cluster 71 69 95 95 166 164
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.170 0.118 0.169 0.076 0.169
t-statistics in parentheses, OLS regression analysis used, standard errors are clustered at the individual level; variables group affiliation and experience centered; positive (negative)
experience take into account only cases in which people received more (less) than they expected; +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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TABLE 4 | Regression analysis for changes in cooperation due to group change from round 10 to round 11.
Cooperation (in Taler) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiment 1 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 2 Overall Overall
Interaction partner’s group affiliation 0.552 0.255 0.354 −0.160 0.493+ −0.0193
(0 = outgroup; 1 = ingroup) (1.18) (0.96) (0.94) (−0.54) (1.73) (−0.09)
Round (round 10 = 0, round 11= 1) 1.573** 0.461+ 2.250*** 0.898* 1.951*** 0.614**
(3.37) (1.69) (6.00) (2.57) (6.84) (2.68)
Group affiliation*round 3.604* 0.342 1.042 0.140 1.924* 0.359
(2.46) (0.43) (0.88) (0.14) (2.16) (0.52)
Experimental lab (0 = Bonn,1 = Erfurt) 0.139 −0.0341 −0.167 0.144 −0.0357 0.114
(0.22) (−0.10) (−0.28) (0.30) (−0.08) (0.36)
Expectations 0.890*** 0.609*** 0.720***
(20.47) (7.40) (13.42)
Constant 4.675*** 0.424 4.271*** 1.541** 4.384*** 1.107***
(9.07) (1.56) (9.70) (3.20) (13.23) (3.48)
Observations 144 144 192 192 336 336
Cluster/Subjects 72 72 96 96 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.702 0.088 0.391 0.084 0.506
t-statistics in parentheses, OLS regression analysis used, standard errors are clustered at the individual level, variables group affiliation and round centered, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
identity due to group change (Table 4, Model 2). To further test
whether the group change effect could partially be explained by
expectations, we conduct a mediation analysis clustering across
individuals and using bootstrapping to estimate standard errors
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008). This analysis reveals a significant
mediation [total indirect effect: b = 3.26, CI95:(0.97; 5.49)].
10
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we find ingroup favoritism to be a dynamic
phenomenon that develops over contacts with the ingroup and
the outgroup. This dynamic ingroup-favoring effect is not driven
by differences in generalizing experiences or gradual changes
over rounds. In contrast, we find that differences are mainly
driven by one specific event, namely the change of groups that
occurred after round 10. This finding can be due to the fact that
a group change activates social identity by making the distinction
between outgroup and ingroup more salient.
However, before rejecting the ingroup-favoring generalization
bias as a potential influence factor, one has to point to several
potential limitations of our experiment. First, it has to be
acknowledged that the power of the experiment was limited due
to the relatively low number of participants. Second, in one of
the two labs involved (the lab in the city of Erfurt), mainly 1st
year students (95%) took part in the experiment, who might still
have had low identification with their university, perceived lower
status or other characteristics that were not observable.
With our second experiment, we aimed to overcome these
limitations and to test the stability of the findings more generally.
To increase the chances of observing rational updating or
generalization biases from the beginning, we made social identity
more salient from the beginning by revealing to participants that
1091% of the total effect could be explained by the indirect effect.
they would interact with different people from the University
of Bonn or the University of Erfurt. The resulting increase in
group distinctiveness can be expected to affect group perceptions
(Spears et al., 1985; Acorn et al., 1988; McConnell et al., 1994) and
ingroup favoritism should generally increase with salience of the
ingroup (see the meta-analysis by Mullen et al., 1992).
Experiment 2
Methods
Ninety-six people (mainly students from the University of Bonn
and the University of Erfurt, 65 of whom were female) were
recruited in the same way as in Experiment 1. Participants’
payments depended on their decisions, and earnings ranged
from 6.70 to 21.70 Euros (approx. USD 9.00 to USD 29.30).
We applied the same procedure as in Experiment 1, with the
exception that this time we explicitly named the city of the
interaction partner in the instructions so that all participants
were aware of whether they were interacting with students from
the University of Bonn or Erfurt. Everything else remained the
same.
Results and Discussion
Again, the group manipulation proved to be successful in that
people indicated a higher interpersonal closeness between self
and ingroup (M = 5.25, SD = 1.63), as compared to self and
outgroup (M = 3.46, SD = 1.73), prior to playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game, t(95) = 9.75, p < 0.001, d = 1.06.
Using the same analyses as in Experiment 1, we again find
that cooperation is higher for the ingroup as compared to the
outgroup, b = 1.01, t(95) = 4.93, p < 0.001, d = 0.28 and the
same holds for expectations, b = 1.15, t(95) = 5.58, p < 0.001,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 476
Dorrough et al. The development of ingroup favoritism
d = 0.36 (Table 1, Models 3 and 4). Similar to Experiment
1, the bias score indicating average ingroup favoritism in the
respective round increases over the course of time, b = 0.11,
t(18) = 3.90, p = 0.001, again speaking for the ingroup favoritism
to be dynamic. Hence, in each of the 20 rounds, favoring the
ingroup over the outgroup increases by 0.11 Taler. Furthermore,
we replicate the effect that there is no significant difference in
cooperation in the first round, b = 0.69, t(93) = 0.94, p = 0.347
(Table 2, Model 3), but it appears in the last round, b = 1.83,
t(93) = 2.84, p = 0.005 (Table 2, Model 4).
We again do not find support for the ingroup-favoring
generalization bias (Table 3, Models 3 and 4). Generalization of
positive and negative experiences does not differ between ingroup
and outgroup (Figure 2, right), with both respective interactions
being reversed in direction and not significant. The strong effect
of the change in groups after round 10, observed in Experiment
1, is not fully replicated, but a tendency in the same direction is
observed, b = 1.04, t(95) = 0.88, p = 0.383 (Table 4, Model 3; see
also Figure 1, right). We have no conclusive explanation for why
the magnitude of the effect is reduced but perhaps the stronger
and more salient group manipulation that was applied already in
the beginning of Experiment 2 might have contributed to it in
that it reduced potential later contrast effects between ingroup
and outgroup. As before, none of the comparisons between
round 1 and 10 as well as between round 11 and 20 reveals
significant changes. When running a regression predicting the
bias score by round and adding a dummy for the experimental
phase (before or after group change), the dynamic in ingroup
favoritism is no longer significant, which is in line with the results
of Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 was designed to readdress the development of
ingroup favoritismwith amore salient initial groupmanipulation
at the beginning. We were thus able to replicate the result of a
developing ingroup-favoring effect over repeated interactions in
a prisoner’s dilemma game. Again there was no support for the
second hypothesis concerning systematic biases in generalization
of experiences.
Overall Analysis
Given the similarity between Experiments 1 and 2, we conduct
an overall analysis to generate best estimates concerning the
dynamic effects.11 The detailed development of cooperation and
expectations is shown in Figure 3.
Generally, there is clear evidence for a dynamic development
of ingroup favoritism in cooperation since we find that ingroup
favoritism (as indicated by the round-specific bias score)
significantly increases over time, b = 0.15, t(18) = 5.46,
p < 0.001. There is no indication for a generalization bias in
updating of expectations neither for positive, nor for negative
experiences, although there is a strong effect of experience on
11Due to the imbalance of order conditions (ingroup vs. outgroup first) between
Experiments 1 and 2, random assignment to experimental conditions is no longer
given when pooling data over both experiments. Therefore we cannot rule out
potential confounds concerning our results. However, when including a dummy
for experiment (1 vs. 2) in the regression models (predicting generalization bias,
group change, and expectations) to control for potential differences between
studies, we observe the same pattern of results.
updating in general (Table 3, Models 5 and 6). In the overall
analysis, the effect of the change in groups between round 10
and 11 seems to be the main force driving differences between
ingroup and outgroup (Table 4, Model 5). When controlling for
expectations, the group change effect is no longer significant,
again indicating that the effects of group change on ingroup
favoring are mediated by expectations (Table 4, Model 6), which
is further confirmed by a mediation analysis using bootstrapping
to estimate cluster corrected standard errors (clustering at the
level of individuals), b = 1.56, CI95:(0.46; 2.64). In contrast,
ingroup favoritism does not change over repeated interactions
with several members from the ingroup or the outgroup, as
indicated by the fact that there are no systematic differences
between rounds 1 and 10, b = −0.52, t(167) = −0.82, p =
0.415, as well as rounds 11 and 20, b = 0.20, t(167) = 0.34,
p = 0.736. Overall, this result indicates that the dynamics we
have observed are mainly due to changing groups, which makes
the comparison between groups more salient. Gradual effects of
biased generalization in repeated interactions are not observed
and findings after the first interaction with a member from
the respective group are more in line with rational models of
belief updating that do not assume differential effects between
ingroups and outgroups. A detailed development of cooperation
by experimental session is shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, the
comparison between sessions also reveals that effect of group
change is larger when switching from outgroup to ingroup than
vice versa.
Expectations (Figure 3, right) show a similar general pattern,
although there is a tendency toward expecting more cooperation
from the ingroup already in the first round, b = 0.81, t(167) =
1.71, p = 0.089, which diminishes and even reverses in
subsequent interactions with members from the same group up
to round 10, b = −1.18, t(167) = −1.82, p = 0.071. No
systematic differences can be observed between rounds 11 and
20, b = −0.74, t(167) = −1.12, p = 0.226.
General Discussion
A recent meta-analysis (Balliet et al., 2014) showed that,
aggregated over the large set of available studies, individuals tend
to cooperate more with members of their ingroup as compared
to members of an outgroup. Overall, this effect of ingroup
favoritism is small to medium in size and a similar difference
prevails concerning expectations. The meta-analysis identified
several moderators for ingroup favoritism. Of particular interest
for our study was the finding that cooperation between the
ingroup and the outgroup is stronger in repeated interactions
with changing interaction partners from the same group (i.e., the
ingroup or the outgroup), as compared to one-shot interactions.
We expected that differences are due to dynamic developments
over repeated interactions. To test this assumption, we assessed
ingroup favoritism through cooperation behavior in a repeated
continuous prisoner’s dilemma where participants sequentially
interacted with 10 members of the ingroup (own city and
university) and subsequently with 10 different members of the
outgroup (other city and university) or vice versa. Aggregated
over all trials, we replicated ingroup favoritism in cooperation
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and expectation and found effects that are comparable in size
to the results from the meta-analysis. More importantly, we
observed a development of ingroup favoritism over time, in that
the intergroup bias—the systematic tendency to evaluate the own
group more positively or behave more positively toward the
ingroup—in cooperation changed in favor of the ingroup over
repeated contact with both groups. However, rational updating of
expectations based on real differences in experienced cooperation
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with the ingroup as compared to the outgroup did not seem to be
the crucial driver for the observed dynamics.We also did not find
support for an ingroup-favoring generalization bias suggesting
that people generalize differently (and in an ingroup-favoring
way) over past experiences with ingroup or outgroup members.
Although individuals updated their expectations concerning
the behavior of members from the ingroup and the outgroup
with repeated interactions, this updating process did not differ
between groups and is hence unbiased with regard to the
difference between ingroup and outgroup. Rather, we see that
ingroup favoritism only occurred from the moment people
effectively got into contact with the second of both groups, that
is, after the group change in round 11. As illustrated in Figure 3,
a systematic difference in restart effects can be observed. While
restart effects in general are typical for behavior in repeated
social dilemmas after a restart of the game (Cookson, 2000;
Fischbacher et al., 2001), in our experiments the effect was
particularly pronounced when playing with the outgroup first
before interacting with the ingroup. The cooperation pattern
during the first 10 rounds shows the typical declining pattern for
social dilemma games. One could assume that, when contrasting
both groups, people start more optimistically when first playing
with an outgroup member followed by interactions with ingroup
members (“my group will be much nicer than the other group”)
as compared to the other way around (“the other group cannot be
much better than my group”). When comparing our findings to
the results from previous studies, it is worth noting that the meta-
analysis (Balliet et al., 2014) indicates consistent ingroup favoring
for one-shot interactions, while over two studies we consistently
do not find ingroup favoring in the first round of a repeated
interaction. Hence, the anticipation of subsequent interactions
even with other persons seems to influence behavior.
Interestingly, expectations mediate the occurrence of ingroup
favoritism after group change. The development of ingroup
favoritism between round 10 and 11 (group change) is conveyed
by increasing expectations when the interaction partner is from
the ingroup compared to the outgroup. When controlling for
expectations, the effect of group change on ingroup favoritism
disappears.
Given that our result concerning the factors driving dynamics
in ingroup favoritism leads to different results than a priori
expected, and since Experiment 2 replicated the jump after
group change only as a tendency, more studies are needed to
validate our findings and conclusions further. We think that the
research paradigm developed for this study is useful for this
purpose, since it allows us to conduct investigations in a highly
controlled setting. Although we did not find evidence supporting
the ingroup-favoring generalization bias in our experiments,
we would not exclude the possibility that such patterns might
occur in other settings with more homogeneous groups or less
anonymous intergroup contact. Additionally, strictly speaking
we only have 3 (Experiment 1) and 4 (Experiment 2) independent
observations, since all participants in one session were connected.
Further studies with more observations would be recommended.
However, there are natural limitations for running more subjects
since the organization of such experiments in two labs that
require full participation is rather cumbersome.
The present studies assess the development of ingroup
favoritism, which is one aspect of parochial altruism. Parochial
altruism explains intergroup conflict through two phenomena
that have been closely linked in human evolution: the readiness
to benefit the ingroup (ingroup love) and to harm the outgroup
(outgroup hate). The prisoner’s dilemma used in the current
investigation allows one to study ingroup love elaborately. At the
same time, the prisoner’s dilemma does not allow one to assess
people’s motivation to harm the outgroup. Future studies should
rely on extended paradigms that allow one to measure both
components of parochial altruism separately (DeDreu, 2010) and
to identify potential dynamics in both aspects.
Acknowledgments
We thank JeronimMorina for the programming and our research
students in Bonn and Erfurt for their assistance in conducting the
experiments.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00476/abstract
References
Acorn, D. A., Hamilton, D. L., and Sherman, S. J. (1988). Generalization of biased
perceptions of groups based on illusory correlations. Soc. Cogn. 6, 345–372. doi:
10.1521/soco.1988.6.4.345
Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., and Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale
and the structure of interpersonal closeness. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 63, 596–612.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596
Balliet, D., Wu, J., and De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014). Ingroup favoritism
in cooperation: a meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 140, 1556–1581. doi:
10.1037/a0037737
Barlow, F. K., Paolini, S., Pedersen, A., Hornsey, M. J., Radke, H. R., Harwood, J.,
et al. (2012). The contact caveat: negative contact predicts increased prejudice
more than positive contact predicts reduced prejudice. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.
38, 1629–1643. doi: 10.1177/0146167212457953
Baxter, G. W. Jr. (1973). Prejudiced liberals? Race and information effects in two-
person game. J. Confl. Resolut. 17, 131–161. doi: 10.1177/002200277301700107
Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., and Fehr, E. (2006). Parochial altruism in humans.
Nature 442, 912–915. doi: 10.1038/nature04981
Birtel, M. D., and Crisp, R. J. (2012). ”Treating” prejudice: an exposure-therapy
approach to reducing negative reactions toward stigmatized groups. Psychol.
Sci. 23, 1379–1386. doi: 10.1177/0956797612443838
Bogaert, S., Boone, C., and Declerck, C. (2008). Social value orientation and
cooperation in social dilemmas: a review and conceptual model. Br. J. Soc.
Psychol. 47, 453–480. doi: 10.1348/014466607X244970
Cookson, R. (2000). Framing effects in public goods experiments. Exp. Econ. 3,
55–79. doi: 10.1007/BF01669207
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 31, 169–193. doi:
10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125
De Cremer, D., and van Vugt, M. (1999). Social identification effects in social
dilemmas: a transformation of motives. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 871–893.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 476
Dorrough et al. The development of ingroup favoritism
De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010). Social value orientation moderates ingroup love but not
outgroup hate in competitive intergroup conflict. Group Process. Intergr. Relat.
13, 701–713. doi: 10.1177/1368430210377332
De Dreu, C. K. W., Balliet, D., and Halevy, L. (2014). Chapter one –
parochial cooperation in humans: forms and functions of self-sacrifice in
intergroup conflict. Adv. Motiv. Sci. 1, 1–47. doi: 10.1016/bs.adms.2014.
08.001
Dion, K. L. (1973). Cohesiveness as a determinant of ingroup–outgroup bias.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 28, 163–171. doi: 10.1037/h0035725
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., and Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally
cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Econ. Lett. 71, 397–404.
doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9
Goette, L., Huffman, D., and Meier, S. (2006). The impact of group membership
on cooperation and norm enforcement: evidence using random assignment
to real social groups. Am. Econ. Rev. 96, 212–216. doi: 10.1257/000282806777
211658
Goette, L., Huffman, D., Meier, S., and Sutter, M. (2012). Competition between
organizational groups: its impact on altruistic and antisocial motives. Manag.
Sci. 58, 948–960. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1466
Greiner, B. (2004). An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments,Vol.
63, (Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen GWDG Bericht), 79–93.
Available online at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13513/
Henderson-King, E. I., and Nisbett, R. E. (1996). Anti-black prejudice as a function
of exposure to the negative behavior of a single black person. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 71, 654–664. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.4.654
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., and Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 53, 575–604. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135109
Jost, J. T., and Burgess, D. (2000). Attitudinal ambivalence and the conflict between
group and system justification motives in low status groups. Soc. Psychol. Bull.
26, 293–305. doi: 10.1177/0146167200265003
Komorita, S. S., and Parks, C. D. (1995). Interpersonal relations: mixed-motive
interaction. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 46, 183–207. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.46.
020195.001151
Levine, M., Cassidy, C., Brazier, G., and Reicher, S. (2006). Self categorization and
bystander non-intervention: two experimental studies. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 32,
1452–1463. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2002.tb01446.x
Levine, M., and Thompson, K. (2004). Identity, place, and bystander intervention:
social categories and helping after natural disasters. J. Soc. Psychol. 144,
229–245. doi: 10.3200/SOCP.144.3.229-245
Macrae, C. N., and Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: thinking
categorically about others. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 51, 93–120. doi: 10.1146/
annurev.psych.51.1.93
McConnell, R. A., Sherman, S. J., and Hamilton, D. L. (1994). Illusory
correlation in the perception of groups: an extension of the distinctiveness-
based account. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 414–429. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.67.
3.414
Mullen, B., Brown, R., and Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience,
relevance, and status: an integration. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 22, 103–122. doi:
10.1002/ejsp.2420220202
Mussweiler, T., and Ockenfels, A. (2013). Similarity increases altruistic
punishment in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 110, 19318–19323. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1215443110
Parks, C. D., Sanna, L. J., and Berel, S. R. (2001). Actions of similar others as
inducements to cooperate in social dilemmas. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 27,
345–354. doi: 10.1177/0146167201273008
Pettigrew, T. F. (1979). The ultimate attribution error: extending allport’s
cognitive analysis of prejudice. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 5, 461–476. doi:
10.1177/014616727900500407
Pettigrew, T. F., and Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup
contact theory. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 90, 751–783. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.
5.751
Preacher, K. J., and Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behav.
Res. Methods 40, 879–891. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.3.879
Pruitt, D. G., and Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming:
critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 28,
363–392. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.28.020177.002051
Rogers, W. (1994). Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Tech.
Bull. 3, 19–23.
Rusch, H. (2014). The evolutionary interplay of intergroup conflict and altruism in
humans: a review of parochial altruism theory and prospects for its extension.
Proc. Biol. Sci. B 281:20141539. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2014.1539
Schubert, T. W., and Otten, S. (2002). Overlap of self, ingroup, and outgroup:
pictoral measures of self-categorization. Self Identity 1, 353–376. doi:
10.1080/152988602760328012
Seithe, M. (2012). “Introducing the Bonn Experiment System (BoXS),” in The
Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for
Economics. Available online at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74638
Simpson, B. (2006). Social identity and cooperation in social dilemmas. Ration. Soc.
18, 443–470. doi: 10.1177/1043463106066381
Spears, R., Van der Pligt, J., and Eiser, J. R. (1985). Illusory correlation in
the perception of group attitudes. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 48, 863–875. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.863
Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. C. (1979). “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict,” in
The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, eds W. G. Austin and S. Worchel
(Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole), 33–47.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Joireman, J., Parks, C. D., and Van Dijk, E. (2013). The
psychology of social dilemmas: a review. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process.
120, 125–141. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.11.003
Wallace, D., and Rothaus, P. (1969). Communication, group loyalty, and trust in
the PD game. J. Confl. Resolut. 13, 370–380. doi: 10.1177/002200276901300305
Wilson, W., Chun, N., and Kayatani, M. (1965). Projection, attraction, and
strategy choices in intergroup competition. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 2, 432–435. doi:
10.1037/h0022287
Wilson, W., and Kayatani, M. (1968). Intergroup attitudes and strategies in games
between opponents of the same or of a different race. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 9,
24–30. doi: 10.1037/h0025720
Wit, A. P., and Wilke, H. A. M. (1992). The effect of social categorization on
cooperation in three types of social dilemmas. J. Econ. Psychol. 13, 135–151.
doi: 10.1016/0167-4870(92)90056-D
Wrightsman, L. S., Davis, D. W., Lucker, W. G., Bruininks, R. H., Evans, J. R.,
Wilde, R. E., et al. (1972). “Effect of other person’s strategy and race upon
cooperative behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma,” in Cooperation and Competition:
Readings on Mixed Motive Games, eds L. S. Wrightsman, J. O’Connor, and N. J.
Baker (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole), 110–125.
Yamagishi, T., Mifune, N., Liu, J. H., and Pauling, J. (2008). Exchanges of group-
based favours: ingroup bias in the prisoner’s dilemma game with minimal
groups in Japan and New Zealand. Asian J. Soc. Psychol. 11, 196–207. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-839X.2008.00258.x
Zelmer, J. (2003). Linear public goods games: a meta-analysis. Exp. Econ. 6,
299–310. doi: 10.1023/A:1026277420119
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Dorrough, Glöckner, Hellmann and Ebert. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 476
